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FINAL REPORT OF THE BERKELEY CENTER FOR
LAW & TECHNOLOGY SECTION 101 WORKSHOP:
ADDRESSING PATENT ELIGIBILITY CHALLENGES
Jeffrey A. Lefstin†, Peter S. Menell†† & David O. Taylor†††

ABSTRACT
Over the past five years, the Supreme Court has embarked upon a drastic and far-reaching
experiment in patent eligibility standards. Since the founding era, the nation’s patent statutes
have afforded patent protection to technological innovations and practical applications of
scientific discoveries. However, the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Mayo Collaborative Services
v. Prometheus Laboratories imposed a new limitation on the scope of the patent system: a useful
application of a scientific discovery is ineligible for patent protection unless the inventor also
claims an “inventive” application of the discovery. The following year, the Court ruled that
discoveries of the location and sequence of DNA compositions that are useful in diagnosing
diseases are ineligible for patent protection in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc. Additionally, in its 2014 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International decision, the Court ruled that
software-related claims are ineligible for patent protection unless the abstract ideas or
mathematical formulas disclosed are inventively applied.
These decisions sent shock waves through the research, technology, business, and patent
communities. Medical diagnostics companies experienced a dramatic narrowing of eligibility
for core scientific discoveries. Reactions within the information technology community have
been mixed, with some applauding the tightening of patent eligibility standards on software
claims and the opportunity to seek early dismissal of lawsuits, particularly those filed by nonpracticing entities, and others criticizing the shift in patent eligibility. Several members of the
Federal Circuit bluntly criticized the Supreme Court’s shift in patent eligibility standards on
jurisprudential and policy grounds. Additionally, the Patent Office has struggled to apply the
Supreme Court’s new and rapidly evolving standards.
As this sea change unfolded, many patent practitioners, scholars, PTO officials, and jurists
hoped that the Supreme Court would provide fuller and clearer guidance on patent eligibility
standards. In the aftermath of the Supreme Court rejecting the invitation to reexamine its Mayo
decision, many stakeholders have shifted their attention toward legislative reforms. This
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Report summarizes the presentations and discussion of a workshop that included leading
industry representatives, practitioners, scholars, policymakers, and a retired jurist exploring the
legal background and effects bearing on legislative action.

2018]

ADDRESSING PATENT ELIGIBILITY CHALLENGES

553

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................554
II. BACKGROUND MEMO ....................................................................................558
A. LEGAL BACKGROUND AND WORKSHOP GOALS ......................................558
B. SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS .....................................................563
1. RESULT OF HUMAN EFFORT ................................................................563
2. PHYSICALITY ............................................................................................563
3. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OR EMBODIMENT ....................................564
4. LIST OF EXCLUSIONS .............................................................................564
5. TECHNOLOGICAL ARTS .........................................................................564
6. ELIMINATION OF ELIGIBILITY IN FAVOR OF OTHER
STATUTORY DOCTRINES .......................................................................565
7. NO CHANGE ............................................................................................566
C. GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS..566
1. SCOPE OF ELIGIBILITY ..........................................................................566
2. CLARITY ....................................................................................................566
3. CONSTRAINT ON JUDICIAL INTERVENTION .....................................567
4. FLEXIBILITY .............................................................................................567
5. TECHNOLOGICAL ZONING ..................................................................567
III. WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS ........................................................................568
A. LEGAL FOUNDATION .....................................................................................568
1. PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER LIMITATIONS: PATENT ACT
AND JURISPRUDENCE .............................................................................568
2. § 101 INVALIDITY RATES—COURTS ...................................................575
3. DISCUSSION..............................................................................................580
B. EFFECTS ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ..........................................581
1. FRAMING ..................................................................................................582
2. DIAGNOSTICS, PERSONALIZED MEDICINE, AND BIOSCIENCES ...582
3. SOFTWARE AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES ............................584
C. EFFECTS ON PATENT PROSECUTION...........................................................585
1. THE USPTO’S EXPERIENCE .................................................................585
2. § 101 INVALIDITY RATES—PROSECUTION .......................................586
3. GENERAL DISCUSSION ..........................................................................589
4. BIOSCIENCE .............................................................................................589
5. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY .............................................................590
A. EFFECTS ON PATENT ASSERTION/LITIGATION/CASE
MANAGEMENT .................................................................................................591
1. FRAMING ..................................................................................................591

554

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 33:551

2. DISCUSSION..............................................................................................592
IV. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS ...........................................................................592
A. SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION .............................................................................592
1. THE NEED FOR A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION ......................................593
2. FIELD-SPECIFIC CONCERNS .................................................................595
3. EVALUATION OF EXISTING LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS AND NEW
PROPOSALS ...............................................................................................597
B. TOWARDS A COMPROMISE PROPOSAL: THE NEED FOR CONSENSUSBUILDING ..........................................................................................................599
APPENDIX A: PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER WORKSHOP
AGENDA ..................................................................................................................601
APPENDIX B: PARTICIPANT LIST .....................................................................602
APPENDIX C: PREPATORY MATERIALS ........................................................604

I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past five years, the Supreme Court has embarked upon a drastic
and far-reaching experiment in patent eligibility standards. Since the beginning
of the American patent system, the nation’s patent statutes have afforded
patent protection to technological innovations and practical applications of
scientific discoveries.1 As the Supreme Court explained long ago, although no
one can patent a natural phenomenon or “principle, in the abstract” (such as
steam power, electricity, or “any other power in nature”), the patent system
has recognized an invention in “applying [the processes used to extract, modify,
and concentrate natural phenomena] to useful objects.”2
Notwithstanding the relative stability of this long-standing legal principle3
and in the absence of any legislative change, the Supreme Court engrafted an
additional substantive requirement for patent eligibility of scientific discoveries
in its 2012 Mayo Collaborative Services. v. Prometheus Laboratories decision.4 The
Court unanimously held that a useful application of a scientific discovery is

1. See Brief of Professors Jeffrey A. Lefstin & Peter S. Menell as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner for a Writ of Certiorari at 4–14, Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics,
Inc., 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016) (No. 15-1182), 2016 WL 1605520 [hereinafter Lefstin-Menell
Sequenom Amicus Cert. Petition Brief].
2. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1853) (emphasis added).
3. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S.
127 (1948) and Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) arguably strayed from this principle.
However, Funk Brothers was largely ignored following the enactment of the 1952 Patent Act,
and Flook was effectively overruled three years later in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
4. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
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ineligible for patent protection unless the inventor has claimed an additional
“inventive” application of the discovery.5 The following year, the Court ruled
that the discovery of an isolated DNA sequence useful in diagnosing diseases
is ineligible for patent protection, regardless of whether the sequence would
be novel or non-obvious over the prior art.6 Additionally, in its 2014 Alice Corp.
v. CLS Bank International decision,7 the Court ruled that software-related claims
are ineligible for patent protection unless the abstract ideas, algorithms, or
mathematical formulas disclosed are inventively applied.8
These decisions have sent shock waves through the research, technology,
business, and patent communities. Medical diagnostics companies have
experienced a dramatic narrowing of eligibility for core scientific discoveries.9
Reactions within the digital and high technology community have been
mixed.10 Many high technology companies that rely on software innovation—
ranging from start-ups to Google—and their customers welcomed the
tightening of patent eligibility standards on software claims and the
opportunity to seek early dismissal of lawsuits, particularly those filed by nonpracticing entities.11 At the same time, other high technology companies that
also rely on software innovation—ranging from start-ups seeking financing to
IBM—have been sharply critical of the shift in the patent eligibility landscape.12
Several members of the Federal Circuit have bluntly criticized the Supreme
Court’s shift in patent eligibility standards on jurisprudential and policy
grounds.13 Additionally, the Patent Office has struggled to apply the Supreme

5. See id. at 81.
6. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. 576 (2013) (holding
that synthetic derivatives of naturally occurring molecules may be patent-eligible under 35
U.S.C. § 101, seemingly without any requirement that the synthetic molecule represent an
inventive advance over the naturally occurring species).
7. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
8. See id. at 2359–60. The Court concluded that the representative method claim did no
more than implement the abstract idea of intermediated settlement on a generic computer and
that the system and media claims added nothing of substance to the underlying abstract idea.
9. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT ELIGIBILITY SUBJECT MATTER:
REPORT ON VIEWS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE PUBLIC 35–36 (July 2017),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/101-Report_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XPX9-XW3Y] [hereinafter USPTO REPORT].
10. See id. at 37.
11. See id. at 24–27, 37.
12. See id. at 37–38.
13. See Ariosa Diagnostics Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (Linn, J., concurring) (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court’s blanket dismissal of
conventional post-solution steps” bars patent eligibility to Sequenom’s “truly meritorious”
invention and that the invention at issue would have been valid under the standards reflected
in Le Roy v. Tatham, 63 U.S. 132, 135–36 (1859) (whether the claimed invention “effectuate[d]
a practical result and benefit not previously attained”) (quoting Househill Coal & Iron Co. v.

556

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 33:551

Court’s new and rapidly evolving standards.14
As this sea-change unfolded, many patent practitioners, scholars, PTO
officials, and jurists hoped that the Supreme Court would provide fuller and
clearer guidance on patent eligibility standards. After all, the Court’s sudden
shift in patent eligibility standards was neither squarely posed nor carefully
briefed in the Mayo case.15 With the exception of one amicus brief, based upon
a questionable understanding of historical precedent,16 none of the many briefs
Neilson, 8 Eng. Rep. 616 (H.L. 1843), reprinted in 1 WEBSTER’S PATENT CASES 673, 683 (1844)
and Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 175); Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1286–
87 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Lourie, J., concurring in the denial of en banc rehearing) (noting that
although the claims at issue “recite innovative and practical uses for the [law of nature] . . . [the
Mayo decision] unfortunately obliged [us] to divorce the additional steps from the asserted
natural phenomenon to arrive at a conclusion that they add nothing innovative to the process,”
and commenting that “it is unsound to have a rule that takes inventions of this nature out of
the realm of patent-eligibility on grounds that they only claim a natural phenomenon plus
conventional steps”) (emphasis in original); id. at 1289 (Dyk, J., concurring in the denial of en
banc rehearing) (“[T]here is a problem with Mayo insofar as it concludes that inventive concept
cannot come from discovering something new in nature—e.g., identification of a previously
unknown natural relationship or property. In my view, Mayo did not fully take into account
the fact that an inventive concept can come not just from creative, unconventional application
of a natural law, but also from the creativity and novelty of the discovery of the law itself. This
is especially true in the life sciences, where development of useful new diagnostic and
therapeutic methods is driven by investigation of complex biological systems. I worry that
method claims that apply newly discovered natural laws and phenomena in somewhat
conventional ways are screened out by the Mayo test.”); id. at 1294 (Newman, J., dissenting
from the denial of en banc rehearing) (questioning Mayo’s breadth: “[p]recedent does not
require that all discoveries of natural phenomena or their application in new ways or for new
uses are ineligible for patenting”).
14. The USPTO has issued numerous guidance documents during the past several years
in an effort to keep up with the shifting patent eligibility jurisprudence. See infra app. C
(USPTO Patentable Subject Matter Guidance Documents).
15. See generally Brief for Petitioners, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012) (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 3919717 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners]
(focusing brief on overbreadth of the Prometheus patent claims, not arguing for an inventive
application test, and making no mention of the Neilson v. Harford decision); see also Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 9–11, Mayo Collaborative
Servs., 566 U.S. 66 (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 4040414 [hereinafter Brief for the United States]
(asserting that claims at issue were patent-eligible and do not preempt all practical uses of the
law of nature, but are likely invalid under Sections 102 (novelty) and 103 (nonobviousness)).
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s 2010 Bilski v. Kappos decision, 561 U.S. 593 (2010), took a
cautious, textual approach to patent eligibility and expressly “decline[d] to impose limitations
on the Patent Act that are inconsistent with the Act’s text.” Id. at 612. The breadth and
analytical basis for the Mayo decision came as a shock to many practitioners and scholars.
16. The brief filed by Professor Joshua Sarnoff on behalf of nine law professors, Brief
of Nine Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Mayo Collaborative Servs.,
566 U.S. 66 (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 4071921 [hereinafter Sarnoff Mayo Amicus Brief],
contended that the English Court of the Exchequer’s decision in Neilson v. Harford, 151 Eng.
Rep. 1266 (Ex. 1841), http://www.commonlii.org/uk/cases/EngR/1841/887.pdf
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submitted in Mayo framed the fundamental shift in patent eligibility doctrine
that emerged.17 When the Supreme Court later denied a petition for a writ of
certiorari, without even requesting the views of the government through the
Solicitor General,18 in Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc.—a case that many
Federal Circuit jurists, scholars, and practitioners regarded as an ideal vehicle
for clarifying patent eligibility standards 19 —attention turned toward the
legislative arena.
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court rejecting the invitation to
reexamine its earlier Mayo decision in Sequenom, we began planning a roundtable
discussion among leading industry representatives, practitioners, scholars,
policymakers, and retired jurists to explore the patent eligibility landscape and
possible legislative solutions to the problems that have emerged. Drawing on
the prior experience of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology (BCLT) in

[https://perma.cc/7RNA-UZ85], reprinted in 1 WEBSTER’S PATENT CASES 295 (1844),
established the principle that scientific discoveries should be treated as part of the prior art
and that this principle was brought into U.S. law through O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
See Sarnoff Mayo Amicus Brief at 8–10. However, as Professor Lefstin’s research demonstrates,
the Court of Exchequer was not setting forth a broad principle that scientific discoveries or
laws of nature are to be treated as known or in the prior art. See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Inventive
Application: A History, 67 FLA. L. REV. 565, 580–87 (2015). Rather, the pertinent language from
Neilson v. Harford quoted in the Sarnoff Mayo Amicus Brief and repeated in the Mayo decision
addressed whether Neilson’s invention—the preheating of air injected into a hot blast
furnace—constituted a claim to a machine or an abstract principle. See infra text accompanying
notes 80–88. Furthermore, as Professors Lefstin and Menell have revealed, neither the patent
statutes nor the legislative history of these enactments dating back to the nation’s founding
contain any hint of a second, “inventive application” hurdle for patent eligibility of scientific
discoveries. See Lefstin-Menell Sequenom Amicus Cert. Petition Brief, supra note 1, at 4–14.
17. Neither the Petitioners’ opening brief nor the government’s brief discussed the
Neilson v. Harford decision. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 15; Brief for the United States,
supra note 15. The Respondent’s brief noted that “the patent in Neilson wholly preempted the
‘natural phenomenon’ that ‘heating the blast, in a receptacle, between the blowing apparatus
and the furnace’ would cause iron to smelt more rapidly in a furnace.” Brief for Respondent
at 39, Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. 66 (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 5189089. The
Petitioners’ reply brief argued that Neilson v. Harford is “irrelevant . . . because the patents . . .
narrowly confined a scientific principle within a process that left other uses freely available.”
See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 21, Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. 66 (No. 10-1150),
2011 WL 5562514 (stating only that “Neilson upheld a patent on a mechanical apparatus for
blowing hot air into a furnace, having discovered that hot air worked better than cold”). None
of these briefs addressed or explained the excerpt from Neilson on which the Supreme Court
erroneously based the “inventive application” doctrine. See Lefstin-Menell Sequenom Amicus
Cert. Petition Brief, supra note 1, at 15–20.
18. See Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016).
19. See USPTO REPORT, supra note 9, at 11; see Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc.,
SCOTUSBLOG (compiling certiorari petition party and 22 amici briefs),
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/sequenom-inc-v-ariosa-diagnostics-inc/
[https://perma.cc/9NVN-MFHP].
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hosting roundtables on salient intellectual property issues,20 in the fall of 2016
we began planning this event with funding from Google and Intel
Corporation. We insisted on and received complete independence from the
funding organizations.
We sought participants with significant knowledge and experience in the
key industries affected by the shift in patent eligibility standards—principally
the bioscience and software fields. To promote candid discussion among these
participants, we established the following ground rules: (1) Participants would
be free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the
affiliation of the speaker(s) could be revealed; (2) We would prepare a report
describing the results of the workshop—and that report would not attribute
statements or views to individuals (other than the co-convenors); and (3) The
report would list the participants and be made available to the public through
BCLT. Appendix A contains the Workshop Schedule. Appendix B contains
the list of participants. Appendix C lists the preparatory materials that we
distributed to the participants in advance of the workshop. This document
constitutes the workshop report.
Part I contains a lightly edited version of the background document that
we circulated to participants prior to the workshop. Part II summarizes the
four workshop sessions leading up to the discussion of legislative proposals:
(A) legal background; (B) effects on research and development (R&D); (C)
effects on patent prosecution; and (D) effects on patent assertion, litigation,
and case management. Part III summarizes the discussion of legislative
proposals and sets forth a framework for seeking compromise on reform
legislation.
II.

BACKGROUND MEMO

A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND AND WORKSHOP GOALS

Over the past several years, the Supreme Court has embarked on a
dramatic experiment in patent eligibility jurisprudence. For most of American
patent law history, the boundary of the patent system was drawn between
abstract principles and practical applications of those principles as embodied
in statutorily-defined categories of inventions. Although augmented by
limitations to the technological arts and by the exclusion of mental steps and
printed matter, the distinction between abstractions and practical applications
remained the primary test of patent eligibility since the nation’s founding era.

20. See, e.g., Stuart Graham, Peter Menell, Carl Shapiro, & Tim Simcoe, Final Report of the
Berkeley Center for Law & Technology Patent Damages Workshop, 25 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 115
(2018).
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In Gottschalk v. Benson (1972),21 Parker v. Flook (1978),22 and Diamond v. Diehr
(1981), 23 the Supreme Court charted an uncertain course as it confronted
advances in information technologies. The Court’s decisions vacillated among
multiple rationales for the patent eligibility doctrine: a requirement of
tangibility; hesitation to extend the reach of the patent system to areas
unanticipated by Congress; and the exclusion of concepts that had “always
existed” such as laws of nature and basic mathematical relationships. And
while each case presented a different vision of 35 U.S.C. § 101—the statutory
section governing patent eligibility—the Court maintained a pretense that each
was consistent with its long-standing principles. Nonetheless, at the end of its
path in Diehr, the Court reaffirmed two traditional foundations of the patent
eligibility doctrine: that the boundary of eligible subject-matter lay between
abstract principles and practical applications of those principles, 24 and that
considerations of prior art play no role in determining eligibility under § 101.25
Nearly thirty years after Diehr, the Court reopened the interpretation of
§ 101 in Bilski v. Kappos.26 Bilski acknowledged that Congress had not limited
patent-eligible subject matter other than setting forth the eligible categories of
inventions in § 101.27 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that “as a matter of
statutory stare decisis going back 150 years,” 28 its precedents demanded the
exclusion of “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”29 Bilski
declined to further explain the rationale for imposing extra-textual limitations
on patent-eligible subject matter or explain how such limitations were to be
applied in practice.
However, in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, the Court
grounded the patent eligibility doctrine in the rationale that patents preempting

21. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
22. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
23. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
24. See id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or
mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”); id. at 191 (“We recognize, of course, that when a claim recites a mathematical
formula (or scientific principle or phenomenon of nature), an inquiry must be made into
whether the claim is seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract.”).
25. See id. at 188–89 (“The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the
process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls
within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”).
26. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
27. See id. at 601.
28. Id. at 602.
29. Id. at 601. It was not until Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), that abstract ideas
were described as a separate category of excluded subject matter. See id. at 71–72; the Court’s
earlier precedents simply distinguished between principles (including laws of nature) in the
abstract and practical applications. See Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852).
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access to fundamental principles would foreclose more innovation than they
would promote.30 At the same time, drawing on a markedly ahistorical reading
of foundational nineteenth century cases such as Neilson v. Harford,31 O’Reilly v.
Morse, 32 and in Justice Douglas’s 1948 opinion in Funk Brothers, 33 the Mayo
Court suggested that the test for patent eligibility under § 101 was neither
practical application nor the extent to which a claim preempted an underlying
principle. 34 Instead, patent eiligibility would depend on whether the claim
represented an “inventive” application of that principle.35 In Alice Corp.,36 the
Court extended the Mayo framework to computer-implemented inventions,
confirming that Mayo’s requirement for an “inventive concept” in the claim
represents the new test for patent-eligible subject matter under § 101.37
The Mayo/Alice decisions established a two-step inquiry for determining
patent eligibility:
Step 1: Does the patent claim a patent-ineligible law of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract idea?
Step 2: If so, does the claim nevertheless contain an inventive concept
sufficient to transform the ineligible law of nature, natural phenomena, or
abstract idea into a patent-eligible application of the ineligible subject
matter?
The Alice decision emphasized the preemption concerns (identified in
Mayo) as central to patent eligibility and characterized step two as a search for
an “inventive concept”—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is
“sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more
than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”38 In so doing, the Mayo and
Alice decisions brought considerations of prior art and claim scope,

30. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012).
31. 151 Eng. Rep. 1266 (1841).
32. 56 U.S. 62 (1853); see generally, Lefstin-Menell Sequenom Amicus Cert. Petition Brief,
supra note 1.
33. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
34. See Mayo, at 566 U.S. at 72.
35. See id. at 66, 72–73.
36. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
37. See id. at 2355, 2357. The Court’s omission of any reference to “inventive concept”
in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013), in which the claims
were directed to compositions of matter, had led some observers to question whether it was a
universal requirement. While Alice confirmed that an “inventive concept” was required under
§ 101, the Court’s analysis in Alice emphasized that the claims recited only a generic application
of an abstract idea, rather than focusing on inventiveness per se.
38. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73) (alterations in original).
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traditionally lodged in the statutory requirements of non-obviousness39 and
enablement or written description40 into the patent eligibility determination.
Neither Mayo nor Alice addressed the legislative history of § 101’s
predecessor statutes, nor did they engage with the legislative text, history, or
structure of the 1952 Act.41 Moreover, the Court’s decisions have left a raft of
unanswered questions. Must a claim embodying an application of a newly
discovered natural law satisfy a double requirement of both discovery and
invention? Are inventive data-processing algorithms ineligible abstract ideas,
or potentially eligible applications? What is the relationship between the
underlying preemption rationale identified in Mayo and the actual test for
patent eligibility? If the function of § 101 is to calibrate patent scope, how does
that role relate to the other patentability doctrines of the 1952 Act?
The uncertainty and confusion resulting from the Court’s recent
jurisprudence create significant problems for many companies and investors
contemplating research and development projects, as well as for patent
prosecutors, patent examiners, and patent jurists.42 In the decade prior to the
Mayo decision, the USPTO rarely rejected patents on subject matter grounds,
and one could count on one hand the number of judicial § 101 invalidity
decisions in any year. Since Mayo, the number of § 101 invalidity rulings has
skyrocketed, with more than one hundred invalidity determinations per year
during the past two years.43 Courts now routinely confront § 101 invalidity
motions at the very outset of, and throughout, many patent cases. The USPTO
has issued numerous guidance documents cataloging this rapidly evolving
terrain.44
For some, the Supreme Court’s rulings provide a ready means to eliminate
some “unworthy” patents at an early stage of litigation. Yet given the lack of
clarity in the test the Court has framed, do these rulings represent a return to
the vague and subjective “I-know-it-when-I-see-it” standards for patentability
that bedeviled the patent system before the 1952 Act? At the very least, we
have witnessed an inversion of relative patent eligibility standards between the
United States and other developed countries, some of which now maintain
significantly more generous standards of patent-eligible subject matter.45

39. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2013).
40. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2013).
41. See Lefstin-Menell Sequenom Amicus Cert. Petition Brief, supra note 1, at 26–28.
42. See generally David O. Taylor, Confusing Patent Eligibility, 84 TENN. L. REV. 157 (2016).
43. See infra, tbl.1
44. See infra app. C, USPTO Patentable Subject Matter Guidance Documents.
45. See Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning Gold into Lead: How Patent Eligibility
Doctrine Is Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 939, 941 n.10
(2017) (reporting that over 1,700 patent applications covering the same inventions that were
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Many observers saw a chance for the Supreme Court to moderate or at
least clarify Mayo’s effect on patent eligibility in 2015. Relying on a narrow
interpretation of Mayo, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held in
Ariosa Diagnostics v. Sequenom that an innovative prenatal diagnostic test was
ineligible under § 101, because the inventors, having discovered a natural
phenomenon, had relied upon known means for its practical application. 46
Nonetheless, despite widespread support for reviewing the decision, the Court
denied the writ of certiorari without even requesting the Solicitor General’s
views. The Court’s refusal signals that the Court is not inclined to act on the
serious challenges created by its recent jurisprudence and is unlikely to further
refine its § 101 jurisprudence in the foreseeable future.47 Responsibility now
lies with Congress to bring greater clarity, consistency, and logic to patent
eligibility.
The workshop aimed to: (1) identify areas of consensus and disagreement
on the appropriate scope of patent eligibility; (2) understand the impact of the
recent decisions on R&D, use of the patent system, and use of trade secret and
copyright protection; and (3) explore potential legislative approaches to patent
eligibility.
While various groups have been considering potential legislative reforms,
there appears to be a substantial divide across the range of technology
industries. The workshop aimed to provide a forum for discussing these
perspectives and hopefully to bridge the divide through candid engagement.

rejected in the U.S. as ineligible were considered eligible in both China and the European
Union). The database identified the abandoned U.S. patent applications in the following fields
(with the number of applications in each field shown in parentheses): Drug and Therapeutics
(474); Molecular Biology and Microbiology (356); Amusement Devices (245); Combinatorial
Chemistry (238); Measuring and Testing (83); Databases (80); Multicellular Living Organisms
(38); Structural Design (35); Control Systems (21); Business Methods (18); Surgery (17);
Chemistry (15); Immunology (15); Computer Graphics (14); Food Or Edible Materials (11);
Agriculture (10); User Interfaces (9); Organic Compounds (8); Data Processing (5); Artificial
Intelligence (3); Education And Demonstration (3); Electrolysis (3); Vehicle Navigation (3);
Communications (2); Telecommunications (2); Coatings (2); Information Security (2);
Cleaning & Compositions (2); Electro-Chemistry; (2) Marine Propulsion (1); Resins And
Rubbers (1); Refrigeration (1); Compositions: Ceramic (1); Video Recording (1); Mineral Oils
(1); Radiation Imagery (1); Dentistry (1); Registers (1); Image Analysis (1); Chemical
Disinfecting (1); Digital Communications (1); Fluid Sprinkling (1); Power Plants (1); Radiant
Energy (1); Error Detection (1); Adhesives (1); Evaporators (1).
46. See 788 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In a case decided after certiorari was denied
in Sequenom, the Federal Circuit has seemingly placed less emphasis on the need for novelty in
the inventor’s means of application. See Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d
1042, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
47. See David O. Taylor, Amending Patent Eligibility, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2149, 2157–
64 (2017).
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SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

In the aftermath of the Court’s denial of a writ of certiorari in Sequenom,
various groups have proposed legislative reforms on patent eligibility.48 The
USPTO also has held workshops and solicited comments on patent
eligibility.49
1. Result of Human Effort
The Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) proposal would
amend the patent statute to replace the current two-part test with a test that
would find a claim eligible if it describes something that is the result of human
effort.50 This approach harkens back to P.J. Federico’s commentary51 and the
legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act, which suggested “anything under the
sun made by man” might be eligible for patenting.52
2. Physicality
Another proposal would replace the current two-step test with a test that
would find a claim eligible if it describes something that takes physical or
tangible form. This approach excludes claims describing purely mental steps.
The IPO proposal reflects this approach to the extent it recites that a “claimed
invention is ineligible . . . if the claimed invention as a whole . . . exists solely

48. For an overview of various potential legislative reforms, see generally id.
49. See USPTO REPORT, supra note 9 at 23.
50. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNERS ASS’N, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2017),
http://www.ipo.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/20170207_IPO-101-TF-Proposed
-Amendments-and-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JE95-UBCW]. The American Intellectual
Property Law Association (AIPLA) proposal, which was released after our workshop, parallels
this proposal. See AIPLA, AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROPOSAL AND REPORT ON
PATENT
ELIGIBLE
SUBJECT
MATTER
(2017),
https://www.aipla.org/resources2/reports/2017AIPLADirect/Documents/AIPLA%20Rep
ort%20on%20101%20Reform-5-19-17-Errata.pdf [https://perma.cc/BPA7-4HQ7].
51. See Pasquale J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1 (1954 ed.),
reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 161 (1993).
52. See S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399 (noting
that “[a] person may have ‘invented’ a machine or a manufacture, which may include anything
under the sun that is made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section 101 unless
the conditions of [this] title are fulfilled.”) That phrase first surfaced in patentable subject
matter jurisprudence in In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1979). It was then picked up
in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980), and Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182
(1981), without its full context or ellipses. See Brief of Professors Peter S. Menell & Michael J.
Meurer as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 10–22, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218
(2009) (No. 08-964), 2009 WL 3199629 (providing comprehensive analysis of the legislative
history of the 1952 Patent Act).
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in the human mind.”53
3. Practical Application or Embodiment
A different proposal would not wholly replace the existing two-step test,
but rather modify only the second part of that test. This proposal would
replace the current search for an “inventive concept” or “inventive
application” of an abstract idea, natural law, or physical phenomenon with a
search for a “practical application” of an abstract idea, natural law, or physical
phenomenon, assuming the claim falls within one of the § 101 categories.54
The Lefstin-Menell Sequenom Amicus Cert. Petition Brief contends that this
approach comports with the core principles of pre-Mayo jurisprudence.55 The
ABA’s Section of Intellectual Property Law (ABA-IPL) submitted comments
to the USPTO that are consistent with a “practical application” test.56
4. List of Exclusions
Another proposal would replace the existing two-step test with a list of
eligibility exclusions, where subject matter would be excluded when claimed
“as such.” This proposal is modeled on the European Patent Convention.57
Paragraph 2 of Article 52 of the European Patent Convention states that “(a)
discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; (b) aesthetic
creations; (c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing
games or doing business, and programs for computers; [and] (d) presentations
of information” “shall not be regarded as inventions.” Paragraph 3 notes,
however, that “Paragraph 2 shall exclude the patentability of the subject-matter
or activities referred to therein only to the extent to which a . . . patent
application or . . . patent relates to such subject-matter or activities as such.”58
5. Technological Arts
Drawing on the constitutional clause authorizing Congress to grant patent

53. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNERS ASS’N, supra note 50, at 1.
54. For a discussion of this approach, see Taylor, supra note 47, at 2205–07.
55. See Lefstin-Menell Sequenom Amicus Cert. Petition Brief, supra note 1, at 27–28.
56. See Letter from Donna P. Suchy, Section Chair, Section of Intellectual Prop. Law,
Am. Bar Ass’n, to The Honorable Michelle K. Lee, Under Secretary of Commerce for
Intellectual Prop. & Dir. of the USPTO (Jan. 18, 2017). The ABA submitted a formal reform
proposal in May 2017. See Letter from Donna P. Suchy, Section Chair, Section of Intellectual
Prop. Law, Am. Bar Ass’n, to The Honorable Michelle K. Lee, Under Secretary of Commerce
for Intellectual Prop. & Dir. of the USPTO (Mar. 28, 2017).
57. European Patent Convention art. 52, Nov. 29, 2001, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199,
http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2016/e/ar52.html
[https://perma.cc/TU3M-VLQ3].
58. Id.
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protection (“[t]o promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts . . .” 59 ), a
technological arts test would ask whether the claimed invention contributes to
the technological arts, solves a technological problem, or otherwise falls within
the technological arts. This test has some similarities with Article 52 of the
European Patent Convention, which provides that European patents are
available for inventions in all technologies susceptible of industrial application
while excluding certain fundamental principles claimed as such. A group of
patent professionals organized by Ken Sonnenfeld, Hans Sauer, and Margaret
Brivanlou (the “Banbury group”) has released a statement favoring a
technological arts requirement. 60 For more information, see the Banbury
Statement listed in Appendix C.
6. Elimination of Eligibility in Favor of Other Statutory Doctrines
Another proposal is to eliminate the doctrine of patent eligibility as a
separate patentability requirement in favor of the other existing statutory
patentability requirements: utility, novelty, non-obviousness, written
description, enablement, and definiteness.61
In conjunction with at least some versions of this proposal, some have
advocated for amending existing statutory doctrines outside of the eligibility
requirement to address the inability of those doctrines to deal with relevant
concerns. For example, Mayo raised concerns that claims encompassing
fundamental principles may impede further research. Yet, many have called
for overruling the Federal Circuit’s narrow conception of the common law
experimental use exception in favor of codifying a broader experimental use
exception. A broader statutory experimental exception might allow, for
example, experimentation on patented technology to improve upon it.
Alternatively, if the limitation of patent-eligible subject matter under § 101 is a
response to the concern that § 112 insufficiently limits the patentee’s reach
into after-arising technologies, the enablement or written description doctrines
might be revised to directly address those concerns.62 Professor Taylor has
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
60. Statement by Kenneth H. Sonnenfeld et al, A Proposed Path Forward for
Legislatively Addressing Patent Eligibility Law, from the Conference: Patenting Genes,
Natural Products and Diagnostics: Current Status and Future Prospects, (Nov. 9–11, 2016),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Updated%20Banbury%20Statement
.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2QV-PZAJ].
61. See, e.g., Brief for Eli Lilly and Company, Eisai Inc., Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc., Pfizer
Inc., and Etiometry, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016) (No. 15-1182), 2016 WL 1298192. For a discussion
of this approach, see Taylor, supra note 47, at 2207–11.
62. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or Dead-Hand Control? Patentable Subject
Matter for Diagnostic Methods After In re Bilski, 3 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 59
(2012); Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1331 (2011).
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proposed modifying the utility requirement to require that claims, rather than
merely specifications, identify the relevant utility.63 Requiring claims to identify
utility would address concerns that claims are not sufficiently clear, over-broad,
and inappropriately prevent the use of basic tools of science and technological
development.64
7. No Change
Another proposal is not to amend the patent statute, but to instead allow
the courts to continue to apply the current law to develop relevant distinctions
between eligible and ineligible claims. In particular, this proposal rejects both
the view that current eligibility law is unduly confusing or problematic and the
view that the existing statutory doctrines adequately address the problem of
poor quality patents. Two groups opposing change to the patent statute are
the Internet Association and the Computer & Communications Industry
Association.65
C.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

If the workshop participants conclude that some statutory amendment
would be appropriate to address problems with the current state of eligibility
law, the next question is what the best approach might be for such an
amendment. It might be helpful to think about potential guiding principles for
analyzing and comparing proposals.66
1. Scope of Eligibility
The scope of eligibility may be thought of in general or specific terms. That
is, as a general matter, many may think that broad but not unlimited eligibility
is the appropriate lens. In terms of particular technologies, like software or
diagnostic technologies, however, there will no doubt be differing views. Each
proposal ought to be analyzed in terms of whether it strikes the correct balance
in terms of the scope of eligibility and takes future, unforeseen technologies
into account.
2. Clarity
To the extent that patent law is meant to induce investment in research

63. See Taylor, supra note 47, at 2189.
64. See id.
65. See generally William G. Jenks, Comments of the Internet Association and the
Computer & Communications Industry Association Regarding the USPTO Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility Guidelines (Part I) (Jan. 18, 2017) (unpublished comment),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/comments_jenkins_jan182017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E8E9-LPX7].
66. See Taylor, supra note 47, at 2189–97.
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and development, as with any property-type right, the governing law and the
governing legal instrument ought to be relatively clear. Thus, patent eligibility
ought to provide a relatively clear demarcation between eligible and ineligible
claims.
3. Constraint on Judicial Intervention
The Supreme Court has decided eight cases in the last forty years (and four
cases in the last seven years) on the issue of patent eligibility, far more than on
any other patent law doctrine. This indicates that the Supreme Court has been
unable to identify a workable standard despite numerous attempts to do so.
Thus, one guiding principle for a statutory amendment may be constraint on
judicial intervention and, in particular, constraint on the Supreme Court’s
opportunity to treat patent eligibility as a common law doctrine subject to
repeated interpretation as a matter of legal doctrine (rather than application).
4. Flexibility
Flexibility refers to the ability of any proposal to be applied meaningfully
to new, unforeseen, and even unimagined human activity. In other words, one
may ask whether a proposal may be meaningfully applied to new claimed
inventions or, instead, whether it is only backward-looking.
5. Technological Zoning
Thinking more broadly along “scope of eligibility” lines, Professor Menell,
among others, has long advocated a sui generis approach for computer
software.67 Beyond administrative considerations, there is no economic basis
for uniform patent duration across vastly different technologies. Prior to the
emergence of software protection, patent eligibility had not been such a
divisive aspect of patent protection. Furthermore, there is relatively little
evidence indicating that computer software developers need robust patent
protection to thrive. For many applications, computer software receives
effective protection under trade secrecy law. In addition, copyright law affords
software protection against piracy. There is relatively strong empirical evidence
that patent protection for computer software has caused more harm than
good. Much of the controversy over patent assertion entities relates to
software-related patents.
Thus, another principle for guiding patent eligibility policy would be to
explore putting software-related technologies into a separate regime that is
tailored to the distinctive economic needs and technological attributes of
computer software. This could involve a system with a much shorter duration
67. See Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV.
1329, 1371 (1986).
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and tailored remedies. It could also exclude pure business methods and other
non-technological fields from patent eligibility. Such compromises could
defuse the apparent impasse between discovery-based and information-based
industries.
III.

WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS

We convened the BCLT patent eligibility workshop at the University of
California at Berkeley on March 17, 2017. Substantially all of the invitees were
able to attend. The participants are listed in Appendix B. In order to
understand the range of views about patent eligibility law and policy, we
organized the day around two principal areas: (1) the legal background and the
effects of the Supreme Court’s shift in patent eligibility standards; and (2) the
need for and design of legislative reform.
As reflected in the workshop agenda contained in Appendix A, we devoted
the morning and early afternoon to a first set of issues: (A) the statutory and
jurisprudential basis for patent eligibility limits and the effects of the recent
Supreme Court cases (Mayo/Myriad/Alice) on the lower courts’ handling of
patent cases; (B) the effects of the shift in patent eligibility law on research and
development in the most affected industries; (C) the effects of shifting patent
eligibility jurisprudence on USPTO activity and patent prosecution; and (D)
the effects of the changed landscape on patent assertion activity, litigation
strategy, and case management. This Part summarizes these four sessions, each
of which ran for approximately 90 minutes. Part III summarizes the second
major discussion area: views on the need for and design of legislative reform
of patent eligibility standards.
A.

LEGAL FOUNDATION

The first session was intended to assess the degree of consensus regarding
the legal foundation for patentable subject matter limitations and to summarize
empirical data on how district courts and the Federal Circuit have applied the
Supreme Court’s recent patentable subject matter rulings.
1. Patentable Subject Matter Limitations: Patent Act and Jurisprudence
Professors Lefstin and Menell opened the workshop by exploring how the
Supreme Court arrived at the Mayo decision and scrutinizing the decision’s
legal basis.68 Their presentation began by noting that in the absence of any
indication that Congress intended to limit the scope of the patent system
beyond the categories it enumerated in § 101, the Supreme Court has based its

68. The presentation largely summarized the analysis in Lefstin-Menell Sequenom
Amicus Cert. Petition Brief, supra note 1.
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subject matter jurisprudence on a particular view of history—in Bilski’s words,
“a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years.”69 In particular, Mayo
relied on a passage from Neilson v. Harford,70 a case decided by the Court of
Exchequer in 1841, which had also been central to the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Le Roy v. Tatham,71 O’Reilly v. Morse,72 and Tilghman v. Proctor73 The
passage quoted in Mayo referred to the challenge raised to Neilson’s patent on
the hot blast iron smelting process, and Mayo concluded that Neilson’s patent
had been sustained only because his apparatus represented an inventive and
unconventional means of applying Neilson’s discovery that preheating the
blast dramatically increased the efficiency of the smelting process. According
to Mayo:
The English court concluded that the claimed process did more than
simply instruct users to use the principle that hot air promotes
ignition better than cold air, since it explained how the principle
could be implemented in an inventive way. Baron Parke wrote (for
the court):
“It is very difficult to distinguish [Neilson’s claim] from the
specification of a patent for a principle, and this at first
created in the minds of some of the court much difficulty;
but after full consideration, we think that the plaintiff does
not merely claim a principle, but a machine embodying a
principle, and a very valuable one. We think the case must
be considered as if the principle being well known, the
plaintiff had first invented a mode of applying it by a
mechanical apparatus to furnaces; and his invention then
consists in this—by interposing a receptacle for heated air
between the blowing apparatus and the furnace. In this
receptacle he directs the air to be heated by the application
of heat externally to the receptacle, and thus he
accomplishes the object of applying the blast, which was
before of cold air, in a heated state to the furnace.” Neilson
v. Harford, Webster’s Patent Cases, at 371.
Thus, the claimed process included not only a law of nature but also
several unconventional steps (such as inserting the receptacle,
applying heat to the receptacle externally, and blowing the air into
the furnace) that confined the claims to a particular, useful

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010).
151 Eng. Rep. 1266 (1841).
55 U.S. 156 (1853).
56 U.S. 62 (1853).
102 U.S. 707 (1880).
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application of the principle.74

The same passage had been cited by Parker v. Flook in support of the notion
(later rejected by Diehr) that discoveries should be treated as part of the prior
art. 75 However, in the briefing for Mayo, only one brief, filed by Professor
Joshua Sarnoff on behalf of nine law professors,76 quoted and discussed the
language from Neilson. Professor Sarnoff’s brief connected the supposed
“requirement for prior art treatment of new discoveries” with a strong
distinction between inventions and discoveries, the latter being ultimately
creations of the divine rather than the human.77
Professors Lefstin and Menell pointed out the close relationship between
this line of analysis and the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Mayo. The Court’s
opinion quoted the referenced passage from the Neilson case, and grounded its
inventive application requirement on the same interpretation of that case
raised in Flook and offered in Professor Sarnoff’s brief.78
Professors Lefstin and Menell then highlighted three critical errors with
the Supreme Court’s Mayo analysis. First, the Court provided no analysis of the
statutory text, which refers repeatedly to patent protection for “inventions” or
“discoveries.” Every major patent statute since the nation’s founding has
afforded patent protection to technological innovations and scientific
discoveries.79 Thus, the dual “invention or discovery” thread runs through the
fabric of U.S. patent law. Furthermore, the very constitutional clause
empowering Congress to establish patent protection expressly refers to
“Discoveries.”80
Second, the legislative history of the patent statutes has consistently
endorsed patent protection for applied scientific discoveries, whether or not they

74. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 83–84 (2012).
75. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 592 (1978).
76. See Sarnoff Mayo Amicus Brief, supra note 16.
77. See id. at 8, 10 (“[D]iscoveries were not thought to be human creations that were the
proper objects of exclusive property rights.”).
78. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 83–84.
79. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–12, § 1 (authorizing granting of patents to
any person who “invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or
device . . . if they shall deem the invention or discovery sufficiently useful and important . . . .”)
(emphasis added); Patent Act of 1793, Stat. 318, § 1 (retaining the dual eligibility structure,
referring to “said invention or discovery”); id. at § 10 (referring to the patentee as the “inventor
or discoverer”). Currently, § 100 defines “invention” to mean “invention or discovery,” and §
101 authorizes one who “invents or discovers” one of the enumerated categories of subject
matter to apply for a patent. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b), 101 (2013).
80. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress “To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries” (emphasis added)).
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are inventively applied. The legislative history of the 1836 Patent Act, perhaps
the most important patent statute in the nation’s history, 81 expresses
Congress’s fervent hope that patent protection would encourage scientific
discovery:
Whoever imagines that, because so many inventions and so many
improvements in machinery have been made, there remains little else
to be discovered, has but a feeble conception of the infinitude and
vastness of mechanical powers, or of the unlimited reach of science.
Much as has been discovered, infinitely more remains unrevealed.
The ingenuity of man is exploring a region without limits, and
delving in a mine whose treasures are exhaustless. “Neither are all
the mysteries of nature unfolded, nor the mind tired in the pursuit
of them.”
The first conceptions of ingenuity, like the first suggestions of
science, are theories which require something of experiment and
practical exemplification to perfect.82

The timing of this pronouncement coincides with the Neilson v. Harford (1841),
LeRoy v. Tatham (1853), and O’Reilly v. Morse (1854) era, indicating that jurists
from this critical formative era would have seen applications of scientific
discoveries to be comfortably within the scope of patentable subject matter.
Professors Lefstin and Menell showed that the dual eligibility framing—
inventions or discoveries—continued through to the present statute. 83 In
particular, the legislative history of the 1930 Plant Patent Act explicitly stated

81. The 1836 Patent Act established the Patent Office. From 1790 to 1793, Congress
authorized any two of the “Patent Board,” comprised of the Secretary of State, the Secretary
for the Department of War, and the Attorney General to grant patents. That system proved
unworkable, and the 1793 Act shifted to a patent registration system with validity decisions
left to courts enforcing patents. The lack of an examination system led to the proliferation of
“unrestrained and promiscuous grants of patent privileges,” JOHN RUGGLES, SELECT
COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE PATENT OFFICE, S. DOC. NO.
24-338, at 4 (1836), eroding faith in the patent system and ultimately leading to the Act of 1836
which instituted examination in a newly constituted Patent Office. See S. REP. ACCOMPANYING
S. BILL NO. 239, 24th Cong. (Apr. 28, 1836).
82. S. REP. ACCOMPANYING S. BILL NO. 239, 24th Cong. (Apr. 28, 1836).
83. See Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (Jul. 8, 1870) (referring to “invention or
discovery” and “inventor or discoverer” throughout the statute. See REVISED STATUTES OF
THE UNITED STATES, 946–53 (2d ed. 1878) (reproducing Rev. Stat. §§ 4884, 4886, 4887, 4888,
4890, 4891, 4892, 4893, 4895, 4896, 4897, 4899, 4902, 4908, 4916, 4917, 4920, 4922, 4923,
4924, 4926, 4927)); Plant Patent Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 703 (amending Rev. Stat. § 4886); Patent
Act of 1952 § 100(a) (restates the traditional definition of “invention” as “invention or
discovery”), § 100(b) (defining “process” to include “a new use of a known process, machine,
manufacture, composition of matter, or material”), § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers . . .
.”).
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Congress’s view that the patent statutes embrace the act of discovery. In that
Act, Congress sought to provide patents for the work of the plant breeder,
who might do nothing more than discover a naturally occurring bud mutant
on a cultivated plant, and then propagate that mutant by conventional
techniques. The proposed scheme raised questions whether the patent system
could embrace discoveries with such minimal human intervention in their
application. Congress was emphatic that the patent laws could, and in fact did,
extend to such discoveries:
Present patent laws apply to “any person who has invented or
discovered any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof . . . .” It will be noted that the laws apply both to the acts of inventing
and discovery and this alternative application has been true of the
patent laws from their beginning. See, for instance, the Patent Act
of 1790 (1 Stat. 109).84

Notably, Congress implemented patents for plants by adding them as a new
category of inventions or discoveries protectable under the basic patentability
statute, R.S. § 4886, indicating that Congress saw no distinction between plant
and utility patents in the nature of the inventive act. Congress specifically
rejected a proposal by the Patent Office that would have had the statute
distinguish between the quantum of invention or discovery required for plant
patents versus utility patents.85
Third, Professor Lefstin explained that neither the Court of Exchequer in
Neilson, nor the U.S. Supreme Court in O’Reilly, had required inventive
application of scientific discoveries.86 The statement emphasized in the Sarnoff
brief and quoted in the Flook and Mayo decisions—“[w]e think the case must
be considered as if the principle [of preheating air prior to injection into a hotblast smelter] being well known”—was a declaration that Neilson’s patent
claimed a machine rather than an abstract scientific principle. While American
precedent of the era (such as O’Reilly) understood the Exchequer’s holding
clearly, Flook and Mayo took that passage out of its proper context and
misinterpreted it drastically.
Professor Lefstin explained that Neilson’s specification had disclosed next

84. H.R. REP. NO. 71-1129, at 7 (1930); S. REP. NO. 71-315, at 6 (1930) (quoting Rev.
Stat. § 4886) (emphasis added).
85. See A Bill to Provide for Plant Patents: Hearing on H.R. 11372 Before the H. Comm. on Patents,
71st Cong. 7 (1930). The Office’s proposal would have had the statute define “invented” and
“discovered” specifically for plant patents. That rejected language stated: “finding a thing
already existing and reproducing the same as well as in the sense of creating.”
86. See generally Lefstin, supra note 16 (explicating the history of the Neilson litigation).
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to nothing about his heating apparatus, yet claimed that his patent covered
every hot-blast smelter no matter what means of heating were employed.
Beyond a challenge on enablement grounds, Neilson’s refusal to be limited to
a particular heating apparatus laid his patent open to the challenge that he had
claimed an abstract scientific principle, rather than a patentable machine.87
The Exchequer recognized that the defendant’s challenge was exactly the
same raised by the defendant in a case it had decided seven years earlier, Minter
v. Wells88—except that Neilson’s case involved a newly discovered principle,
rather than one well-known.
Minter’s patent had claimed a reclining chair embodying the principle of
self-adjusting leverage.89 Like Neilson, Minter had declared that his claim was
not limited to any precise shape or form of chair. The defendants therefore
attacked the patent on the ground that Minter had merely claimed a wellknown principle of mechanics in the abstract.90 The Exchequer rejected the
challenge, holding that Minter’s claim was not to the well-known principle, but
to the application of that principle in the construction of a chair. 91 Thus,
Minter’s claim was not to a well-known principle, but rather it applied a wellknown principle to a chair to produce a patent-eligible machine. The critical
passage in Neilson refers to this doctrine—relating to what constitutes a machine.
Neilson holds that the same doctrine governing applications of well-known
principles should govern applications of newly discovered principles. It does
not declare that scientific discoveries are to be treated as well-known or prior
art for purposes of patent eligibility.92
Reinforcing this point, the English courts have never interpreted Neilson v.
Harford to require inventive application of scientific discoveries. 93
Conventional application of newly discovered scientific principles is all that

87. Processes were not recognized as patentable at the time.
88. 149 Eng. Rep. 1180 (Ex. 1834), http://www.commonlii.org/uk/cases/
EngR/1834/222.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WCV-RMNB], reprinted in 1 CARPMAEL’S PATENT CASES
622 (1834).
89. Id. at 622.
90. Id. at 644.
91. Id. at 646.
92. This conclusion is also apparent from the sentence preceding the passage on which
the Supreme Court derives the inventive application doctrine. That sentence reads: “[A]fter
full consideration, we think that the plaintiff does not merely claim a principle, but a machine
embodying a principle, and a very valuable one.” Neilson v. Harford, 151 Eng. Rep. 1266, 1273
(Ex.
1841),
http://www.commonlii.org/uk/cases/EngR/1841/887.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7RNA-UZ85], reprinted in 1 WEBSTER’S PATENT CASES 295, 371 (1844).
The Exchequer was assessing whether a broad claim to all manner of pre-heating air, like the
broad claim in Minter v. Wells to a wide range of chair shapes, was to an abstract principle or a
machine.
93. See Lefstin, supra note 16, at 591–93.
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English law has ever required.94
The Mayo decision compounded its misinterpretation of early English law
to require inventive application of newly discovered laws of nature by asserting
that Neilson had inventively applied the pre-heating principle. The Mayo
opinion states that “the claimed process included not only a law of nature but
also several unconventional steps (such as inserting the receptacle, applying
heat to the receptacle externally, and blowing the air into the furnace) that
confined the claims to a particular, useful application of the principle.”95 But
Neilson’s patent was sustained precisely because he employed wellunderstood, routine, and conventional means in the application of a new
scientific discovery.96 In rejecting the defendant’s argument that Neilson had
not disclosed enough about the heating means to enable practice of the
invention, the Exchequer relied on the fact that Neilson’s means of preheating
were routine and well-known in the art. As Baron Parke’s opinion
acknowledged and accepted, the patentee argued that:
[t]he mode of heating air was perfectly well known; it was no
discovery of Mr. Neilson’s, everybody knew it. Air had been heated,
and there had been different shaped vessels employed for heating
the air; for heating the air economically, and for heating it to a higher
or lesser degree of temperature; all that was perfectly well known.97

Given the lack of historical foundation for an inventive application
requirement, Professors Lefstin and Menell noted that it was particularly
surprising that the Supreme Court, which has increasingly emphasized
textualist modes of interpretation, would overlook the unbroken chain of
references to patent protection extending to both “inventions” and
“discoveries.” Moreover, by intermingling nonobviousness (§ 103) and

94. See Genentech, Inc.’s Patent, (1989) RPC 147, 213–17; Kirin-Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst
Marion Roussel Ltd., (2004) UKHL 46.
95. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 84 (2012).
96. As the Supreme Court recognized in O’Reilly v. Morse, Neilson’s patent had been
attacked for inadequate disclosure, what modern practitioners refer to as enablement, as well
as for subject matter grounds. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 115 (1853). (“[T]he defendant
among other defences [sic] insisted—that the machinery for heating the air and throwing it
hot into the furnace was not sufficiently described in the specification, and the patent void on that
account—and also, that a patent for throwing hot air into the furnace, instead of cold, and
thereby increasing the intensity of the heat, was a patent for a principle, and that a principle
was not patentable.”) (emphasis added).
97. Neilson, 1 WEBSTER’S PATENT CASES at 344. That the Exchequer acknowledged and
accepted this fact is shown by the judges’ repetition of this point. See id. at 337 (Alderson, B.)
(stating that Neilson’s heating means were “perfectly well known”). Neilson even became the
authority for the proposition that practical applications of discoveries were patentable without
any invention in the means of application. See Lefstin, supra note 16, at 592, 606–08.
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enablement or written description (§ 112) considerations into the subject
matter inquiry, the Mayo/Alice decisions short-circuited the factual inquiries
and structure mandated by the 1952 Act. Professors Lefstin and Menell
surmised that the Court’s failure to engage these critical issues likely resulted
from a lack of adequate briefing. The questions presented did not signal to the
litigants or amicus community that the Court might venture into such a radical
reconsideration of patentable subject matter limitations.
Professors Lefstin and Menell concluded their review of the
Mayo/Myriad/Alice decisions by highlighting the decisions’ impacts on several
key technology industries. For the bioscience industries, the Mayo/Myriad
decisions exclude from patent protection path-breaking discoveries unless they
are inventively applied. This in effect requires scientists working in diagnostics
and other discovery-based fields to make two breakthroughs in order to obtain
patent protection: (1) they must “discover” a law of nature or natural
phenomenon; and (2) they must “inventively” apply that discovery.
Conventional application of even a Nobel Prize-worthy discovery no longer
suffices to obtain a patent. The rule is nominally clear, but excludes subject
matter that has been patentable since the creation of the patent system:
conventional applications of scientific discoveries.
By contrast, for the software industries there is tremendous uncertainty
regarding what constitutes an inventive application of abstract ideas and
algorithms. While pure business methods that do not improve the functioning
of a computer are no longer patent-eligible, there remains substantial
subjectivity surrounding the patent eligibility of computer-implemented
processes in general.
2. § 101 Invalidity Rates—Courts
Robert Sachs presented data on changes in § 101 invalidity rates in the
courts.98 In the decade preceding the Mayo decision (in March 2012), there
were only a handful of district court decisions that found patents invalid under
§ 101.99 Table 1, however, summarizes a significant increase in district court

98. The data was current as of February 28, 2017.
99. See Climax Molybdenum Co. v. Molychem, LLC, No. 02-cv-00311, 2007 WL
3256698 (D. Colo. Nov. 1, 2007); Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. Infousa, Inc., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d
2001 (S.D. Fla. 2008), aff’d on other ground, 587 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009); CyberSource Corp.
v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2011); DealerTrack, Inc. v. Huber, 657 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, rev’d in part, 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC,
609 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 671 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Bancorp Servs.,
L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 771 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (E.D. Mo. 2011), aff’d, 687
F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Glory Licensing LLC v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 2011 WL 1870591
(D.N.J. May 16, 2011); VS Techs., LLC v. Twitter, Inc., 2012 WL 1481508 (E.D. Va. Apr. 27,
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§ 101 invalidity decisions both in the 32 months preceding the Supreme
Court’s Alice decision (in June 2014) and in the 32 months following.
Table 1
All District Court Decisions on § 101 Related Motions
After Mayo but Before Alice
(24 months, June 2012 to June 2014)

After Alice
(32 months, June 2014 to February 2017)
Not
Percent
Invalid
Total
invalid
Invalid

%
Change
PostAlice

Invalid

Not
invalid

Total

Percent
Invalid

Decisions

16

21

37

43.2%

222

137

359

61.8%

+19%

Patents

26

55

81

32.1%

324

454

778

41.6%

+10%

We see a dramatic rise in the number of district court § 101 invalidity
decisions following the Mayo decision, with no more than three in any year
prior to 2012 to an average of 8 per year in the two years following the Mayo
decision. That number increases 10-fold after the Alice decision.
Furthermore, the rate at which patents were found invalid increased
significantly as well. Figure 1 shows the district court outcomes on § 101
invalidity determinations over time.

2012); CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 717
F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc), aff’d 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d
1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013); King Pharms., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 2d 501
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (ruling four claims ineligible), aff’d on other grounds, vacated in part, 616 F.3d
1267 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (reversing § 101 invalidity determination). In addition, the Federal Circuit
struggled with several patentable subject matter disputes appealed from USPTO § 101
rejections. The Federal Circuit also upheld a few PTO patent rejections on eligibility grounds.
See In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
aff’d on different reasoning, Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
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Fig. 1
Section 101 Outcomes in District Courts
June 2014 to February 2017
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The number of decisions rose sharply from 35 in the second half of 2014
to 141 in 2015, and to 161 in 2016. As shown, the percentage of invalidity
determinations fell from a high of 77.1% in 2014 to less than 50% for the first
two months of 2017.
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Table 2 shows the § 101 invalidity decisions by court and litigation stage.
Table 2
Section 101 Decisions by Court and Litigation Stage
June 2014 to February 2017
§ 101
Invalidity
Decisions

% Invalid

Total § 101
Decisions

222

62%

359

1

100%

1

63

68%

92

94

60%

157

62

64%

97

2

17%

12

Federal Circuit

70

91%

77

Appeal-PTABCovered Business
Method Review
(CBM)

7

100%

7

Appeal-JOP

14

88%

16

Appeal-MSJ

24

92%

26

Appeal-MTD

20

95%

21

Appeal-Prelim Inj.
(PI)

1

100%

1

Appeal-PTAB

4

100%

4

Appeal-PTM

0

0%

2

Grand Total

292

67%

436

Tribunal
District Court
Motion for
attorney fees
Motion for
Judgment on the
Pleadings (JOP)
Motion to
Dismiss (MTD)
Motion for
Summary
Judgment (MSJ)
Post-Trial Motion
(PTM)
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District courts have resolved the majority of § 101 controversies early in
case management—on the pleadings, motion to dismiss, and summary
judgment stages. The Federal Circuit has affirmed a high percentage of
invalidity determinations.
Table 3 summarizes the Federal Circuit’s review of § 101 invalidity
decisions.
Table 3
Federal Circuit Review of § 101 Determinations
June 2014 to February 2017
Invalid
Affirmed
AppealCBM
AppealJOP
AppealMSJ
AppealMTD
AppealPI
AppealPTAB
AppealPTM
Total

Not Invalid

Affirmed
Total
Reversed Affirmed Reversed
Per
Curiam

2

1

-

-

-

3

2

12

-

-

2

16

10

13

1

-

2

26

10

10

-

-

1

21

1

-

-

-

-

1

1

7

-

-

-

8

-

-

-

2

-

2

26

43

1

2

5

77

The Federal Circuit has affirmed substantially all district court invalidity
determinations. Nearly two-thirds of affirmances have been with opinion. By
contrast, the Federal Circuit reversed five of the seven district court findings
of no invalidity.
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Figure 2 shows the distribution of invalidated patents across technology
fields.
Fig. 2
Patents Challenged under § 101 by Technology Field
June 2014 to February 2017
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3. Discussion
None of the workshop participants questioned the core points in the legal
presentation. One scholar noted that Professor Sean O’Connor’s research
suggests that the term “discoveries” in the U.S. Constitution reflected a
heightened level of inventiveness. 100 While acknowledging Professor
O’Connor’s research, Professor Menell noted that the 1790 Patent Act and all
subsequent Patent Acts refer to the patentability of “inventions or
discoveries.” Professor Lefstin noted that the legislative history of the Plant
Patent Act of 1930 and the 1952 Act make clear that Congress has supported
broad coverage of both inventions and discoveries, bearing in mind that
patentable “discoveries” have always been practical applications embodied in

100. See Sean M. O’Connor, The Overlooked French Influence on the Intellectual Property Clause,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 739 (2015) (suggesting that the French Encyclopédie defines “discoveries”
as “the most important inventions, rather than the uncovering of existing facts”).
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one of the statutory classes of subject matter, not discoveries in the abstract.
And there was broad consensus among the participants that the basis for the
Supreme Court’s “inventive application” requirement was flawed and that
patent law had long afforded protection for applied discoveries.
One participant commented on the undesirable effects of the Supreme
Court’s recent patentable subject matter jurisprudence on district judges. That
participant noted that docket pressures already motivate judges to reduce their
trial burdens and that the Supreme Court’s “inventive application”
jurisprudence, which can be wielded at early stages of litigation, invites cursory
analysis of patentable subject matter. Based on the clear text of the Patent Act
and jurisprudence, that participant expressed the view that § 101 should be
liberally and broadly construed, and that § § 103 and 112 provide the
appropriate tools for curtailing dubious and overbroad patents.
The discussion turned to participants’ views about what was driving the
Supreme Court’s renewed interest in and approach to patentable subject
matter limitations. Several participants viewed the Supreme Court’s recent
foray into patent eligibility as a misdirected effort to address other problems
in the patent system, notably broad, vague, and inadequately-supported claims.
Others noted perceptions that the non-obviousness standard remains
uncertain and too low with regard to software-related patents. The
proliferation of “low quality” patents in conjunction with the emergence of
patent assertion entities has raised the salience of the patent system, and
perhaps the Supreme Court saw § 101 as a tool for reining in these problems.
One participant focused on jurisprudential philosophy, noting that the
Supreme Court views patentable subject matter limitations as a common law
enterprise.
Other participants emphasized broader moral concerns that might animate
the Court’s jurisprudence, such as public perceptions about bioscience
companies claiming “ownership” of people’s genetic information. One
participant noted that the Court’s patentable subject matter cases may reflect
discomfort with intellectual property protection for fundamental tools or
knowledge building blocks, such as laws of nature and mental steps. Others
noted the intuition that patents are for technology, not business strategies. The
Court’s recent focus on diagnostics, software, and business methods reflects
these considerations.
B.

EFFECTS ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The second session focused on the effects of the shift in patentable subject
matter eligibility on research and development activity. One scholar opened
the session by framing key questions. An industry practitioner then discussed
the relationship between patent protection for diagnostics and advances in
personalized medicine. We then opened the discussion and concluded with
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perspectives from software industry representatives.
1. Framing
The patent system aims to promote innovation by providing time-limited
exclusive rights in exchange for disclosure of useful inventions and discoveries.
Without patents, we would expect many inventors to rely on trade secrets to
appropriate return on their research and development investments.
The efficacy of the patent system is often difficult to measure. Some
innovation occurs without the need for exclusive rights and some inventors
are able to gain patent protection without providing critical information. Due
to the risks of being liable for willful infringement, engineers and scientists in
some fields, such as software, steer clear of reading patents. Patents in other
fields, such as pharmaceuticals, provide critical security needed for the large
capital expenditures and risk of research and development.
The shift in patentable subject matter eligibility suggests several questions
for understanding the effects on research and development activities:
a) Are research institutions and companies shifting their research
agendas?
b) Are research institutions and companies relying more significantly
on trade secrecy and reducing public disclosure of scientific
discoveries, technological inventions, and technical knowledge?
c) Is there greater opportunity for follow-on innovators without
patents on fundamental building blocks?
2. Diagnostics, Personalized Medicine, and Biosciences
An industry practitioner then discussed the relationship between patent
protection for diagnostics and personalized (or precision) medicine. According
to this representative, precision medicine uses a patient’s individual clinical
characteristics to tailor medical intervention. Examples include detecting the
patient’s genotype with increased drug response, measuring drug metabolites
in the patient’s blood, and observing the patient’s clinical response to a drug
as means of modifying and optimizing drug dosage.
Molecular diagnostics play a central role in driving precision medicine
research and development. It provides the clues for determining disease
predisposition, diagnosing disease, assessing disease prognosis, predicting drug
response, and targeting prescriptions and diagnostics. Precision medicine
depends critically upon balanced regulation, robust reimbursement, and
intellectual property rights.
The representative asserted that while few scholars question the need for
strong patents in drug research, there is less understanding of the role of
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patents in medical diagnostics. Such research is more akin to conventional drug
development than software or electronics in terms of its investment patterns
and research life cycles.
Notwithstanding that there have been no significant substantive changes
to patent eligibility and validity standards in the patent statute, patent
protection for diagnostics has significantly eroded over the past decade due to
judicial decisions. While these shifts have had negative impacts on all of life
science research and development, they have been particularly severe for the
diagnostics sector. Reagents and many processes are seen as ineligible for
patent protection. Diagnostic kits can also be more difficult to patent under
the murky standards relating to “abstract ideas.”
Furthermore, trade secret protection for diagnostics research can be
difficult to maintain. Diagnostics companies must publish most details of their
tests in peer-reviewed journals to be eligible for reimbursement. Other forms
of intellectual property—trademark protection for branding and copyright for
instructions—do not provide effective protection to support appropriability,
i.e., the ability to derive a return on research and development investment, for
diagnostics research.
Ultimately, research and development incentives for medical diagnostics
depends critically on the balance among regulation, reimbursement, and patent
rights. There is currently no regulatory framework balancing innovator and
follow-on generic entrants as there is in the prescription drug sector (HatchWaxman legislation). A robust regulatory framework, such as FDA regulation
of laboratory-developed diagnostic tests, would increase quality and safety of
medical diagnostics but would add to the validation and investment burdens
on diagnostics companies to bring their tests to market. Furthermore, the
reimbursement rules governing diagnostics play a critical and uncertain role
for evaluating diagnostics investments. Patent protection can be an important
factor in negotiating reimbursement with health care payers. The shift in patent
eligibility for diagnostics threatens research and development investment in
medical diagnostics.
Other participants elaborated on the adverse effects of the Mayo and Myriad
decisions on the bioscience industries more generally. One participant noted
that venture capitalists and other investors pay significant attention to whether
the fruits of research and development expenditures can be internalized by
their creators. Ultimately, most investors are indifferent between investing in
bioscience, software, or commodities—whichever offers the higher return will
attract more capital. The difficulty of protecting advances in scientific
discoveries has, in that person’s view, tilted investment away from areas that
are more difficult to protect and toward research where trade secrets are more
viable.
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Participants also discussed how the loss of patent protection for isolated
and purified natural products further limits the range of bioscience advances
where investors cannot expect rewards from their investments. An attorney
with a strong bioscience background provided several concrete examples of
important scientific research that was experiencing funding difficulties as a
result of the shift in patent eligibility standards: cytotoxins derived from sea
organisms (purified natural products) that could be used in treating tissue
sarcoma; genes relating to particular genetic mutations; and snake toxins used
for treating multiple sclerosis. That participant also noted that bio-analytical
data, which can in theory be protected by trade secrecy, is often very difficult
to commercialize without disclosure.
One participant drew attention to the Supreme Court’s definition of “law
of nature” in Mayo as a cause of the incoherence across multiple technological
fields. That participant noted that the relationship between biomarkers and
diseases may be naturally occurring, but they are not “laws of nature.” It would
be better, in that participant’s view, to characterize such relationships as
contingent outcomes of evolution. From that perspective, they are no different
in kind from other natural relationships that are discovered in chemistry,
metallurgy, and semiconductors and could be extrapolated to software and
information technologies.
3. Software and Information Technologies
Attorneys working in the software field provided a more mixed view of
the shift in patent eligibility jurisprudence. While not defending the Supreme
Court’s recent decisions on interpretive or jurisprudential grounds, several inhouse counsels in the information technology sector noted that the Alice
decision has not materially affected their companies’ research and
development levels, project choice, or start-up acquisition decisions. One
participant noted that some boards of directors pay attention to whether
potential acquisition targets have patents, but such patents are not typically
determinative in the acquisition decision.
While recognizing that software technology should be patentable, several
technology industry participants commended the Alice decision for weeding
out numerous bad patents, reducing litigation risks and costs, and providing a
means for resolving litigation over weak patents earlier in the process.
One participant noted that software patents continue to be filed, although
patents for analytics are more difficult to pursue. Some of these technologies,
however, can be protected by trade secrecy, especially as more and more of
the software industry shifts to cloud-computing, software as a service, and
enterprise computing business models. This participant noted that algorithmic
technologies are being replaced by neural networks and machine learning,
which are also vulnerable under Alice, but can be protected by trade secrets.

2018]

ADDRESSING PATENT ELIGIBILITY CHALLENGES

585

Another participant noted that software development is more collaborative
and open today. Many platforms rely on open source software, with
competition occurring through implementations and cloud-based services.
An attorney working at a company that has a large research division
commented that distinctions across scientific and technological fields are often
artificial. Many of the most important breakthroughs happen when researchers
cross-germinate methods and findings to open up fertile new research fields.
This is increasingly happening in the digital age in fields such as analytics,
diagnostics, drug development, bioinformatics, and medical imaging. Although
it is sometimes difficult to link patents to products, patents nonetheless are
critical to the investment process. This participant noted that concerns about
basic building blocks being monopolized and royalty stacking can be
exaggerated. Research companies license and cross-license technological
advances. Patents often promote openness and sharing, whereas trade secrecy
can stand in the way. A bigger impediment to research and development is the
commodification of technology, which reduces profit margins. Many research
enterprises are looking for areas where breakthroughs can produce significant
returns on investment.
C.

EFFECTS ON PATENT PROSECUTION

The third session explored the effects of the Supreme Court’s recent
patentable subject matter decisions on patent prosecution. A representative
from the USPTO began by highlighting the agency’s difficulty handling the
changes to the law of patent eligibility. We then heard a presentation by Robert
Sachs on patent prosecution invalidity rates at the USPTO. Participants then
engaged in a general discussion about patent prosecution relating to patent
eligibility, followed by more particular discussion of § 101 prosecution in the
life sciences and information technology sectors.
1. The USPTO’s Experience
The session began with remarks from Robert Bahr, the USPTO’s Deputy
Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy, who described the USPTO’s
efforts to keep up with the rapidly evolving patentable subject matter
jurisprudence. He noted that patentable subject matter emerged as a major area
of uncertainty in 2009 surrounding the Bilski patent. He then summarized the
workload challenges and the efforts to update guidance documents.
Since the Supreme Court decided Bilski in 2010, the USPTO has struggled
to provide guidance to its patent examiners regarding the law governing
eligibility. The Supreme Court did not articulate any eligibility test in Bilski, and
the Court limited its decision to the particular facts of that case.
When the Supreme Court later introduced the “inventive concept” test in
Mayo, it was not immediately clear if this test applied beyond claims related to
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laws of nature. Moreover, Myriad seemed to indicate that a more traditional
eligibility test—one asking whether a claim described something different than
what exists in nature—applied even after Mayo. In Alice, the Court finally made
clear that the “inventive concept” test applied broadly to all of the judicial
exceptions (laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas), but the
Court did not clarify whether the more traditional eligibility test applied in
Myriad has any continuing applicability. As a result, Alice represented a
significant shift in the framework to be applied by patent examiners, but still
did not clearly eliminate other approaches to the question of eligibility.
Moreover, the “inventive concept” test itself does not provide significant
direction to resolve eligibility disputes.
In the face of these Supreme Court decisions—all along the way and even
after Alice—the USPTO has issued a series of guidance documents for
examiners. The preparation of these guidance documents has been increasingly
challenging given both the changes in the governing law and the lack of clarity
associated with application of the “inventive concept” test. Indeed, despite the
issuance of numerous guidance documents examiners have expressed
concerns with how they should apply the Supreme Court’s “inventive
concept” test. The guidance documents provide the examiners with a
framework for determining eligibility. The documents, for example, include
flow charts to guide the examiners in terms of the process. But the documents
do not provide answers in terms of how the test applies in particular cases.
They emphasize particular examples based on judicial opinions.
2. § 101 Invalidity Rates—Prosecution
Robert Sachs presented data on § 101 invalidity rates at the USPTO.101
Table 4 presents the percentage of patents that the USPTO has rejected under
§ 101 in the period preceding the Alice decision and intervals following other
developments: following the issuance of the 2014 Preliminary Guidance
Document; 102 following the issuance of the 2014 Interim Guidance
Document; 103 following the issuance of the July 2015 Guidance Update; 104

101. The data was current as of February 28, 2017.
102. See Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Deputy Comm’r for Patent
Examination Policy, USPTO, on Preliminary Examination Instructions for Determining
Subject Matter Eligibility in view of Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, et al. (June 25, 2014),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/patents/announce/alice_pec_25jun2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3KBG-9L6D].
103. See 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74618
(Dec. 16, 2014) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1), https://
www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/training%20-%202014%20interim%20guida
nce.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4PP-WVV6].
104. See USPTO, JULY 2015 UPDATE: SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY 1
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following the Federal Circuit’s Enfish decision (overturning a district court
§ 101 invalidation decision);105 and following the Federal Circuit’s 2016 McRO
decision (overturning a district court § 101 invalidation decision).106

https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-july-2015-update.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CYS7-ZZ6P].
105. See Memorandum from Robert W. Bahr, Deputy Comm’r for Patent Examination
Policy, USPTO, on Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decisions (Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.
and TLI Commc’ns. LLC v. A.V. Automotive, LLC) 2 (May 19, 2016),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-may-2016_enfish_memo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C8LM-KBCN].
106. See Memorandum from Robert W. Bahr, Deputy Comm’r for Patent Examination
Policy, USPTO, on Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decisions (Nov. 2, 2016),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/McRo-Bascom-Memo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C8LM-KBCN].
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Table 4
USPTO § 101 Invalidation Rates by Technology Center
June 2012 to February 2017

Tech Subtype

Before
Alice
(%)

Prelim
Guidance
2014 (%)

Interim
Guidance
2014 (%)

July
2015
Update
(%)

Enfish
May
2016
(%)

McRO
Nov.
2016
(%)

Agriculture

24.0

24.2

24.5

21.6

22.1

21.2

Biotech

16.9

22.2

21.6

18.4

16.0

15.5

Healthcare

3.2

4.6

4.7

3.1

2.8

3.3

1700

Chemistry

2.0

2.1

2.1

4.5

1.1

1.1

2100

Computers

21.5

22.0

20.9

17.3

15.7

17.3

Communications

13.2

13.3

17.3

21.8

17.3

16.4

Computers

19.7

19.4

23.6

25.5

19.7

21.0

Communications

12.4

12.5

14.8

14.2

13.9

12.5

Computers

10.2

9.9

10.3

9.5

9.1

8.1

3.1

4.3

4.8

4.3

5.1

5.3

3.0

4.1

4.2

3.9

3.1

3.2

Manufacturing

1.8

1.9

2.0

1.9

1.7

1.5

Transportation

12.4

15.6

13.4

13.9

14.3

13.8

Ecommerce

43.3

83.0

92.5

90.7

92.1

90.9

2.5

3.8

4.4

3.0

2.7

2.4

19.7

39.8

50.0

43.3

38.1

35.6

Healthcare

6.2

8.6

10.7

10.0

9.2

9.5

Manufacturing

1.3

1.5

1.3

0.7

0.5

0.4

Tech
Center

1600

2400

2600
2800

3600

3600
Business
Methods

3700

Electrical
Systems
Civil
Engineering

Civil
Engineering
Gaming &
Education

The most dramatic effects have been in business methods and
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gaming/education, although the § 101 invalidity rates in biotechnology and
agriculture have also been high.
3. General Discussion
Even with the USPTO’s various guidance documents, several participants
noted that the Supreme Court’s eligibility test is difficult to apply consistently,
and there is great variance from examiner to examiner in how the test applies.
One characterization of the effect on patent prosecution is the view that patent
examiners and administrative patent judges in many instances could easily
write official actions or opinions related to the same claims coming out either
way—either finding eligibility or finding no eligibility. Examiners are sensitive
to signals from management, so whether there is a signal to lean against
issuance or lean toward issuance makes a difference in how examiners decide
close cases. The impact of this sensitivity to management’s signals has
particular impact on patent eligibility given the subjectivity of the “inventive
concept” test. One participant noted that some patent examiners appear to
have a new attitude that they simply will not find eligibility, at least “not on
[their] watch.” In terms of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, likewise, one
participant expressed the view that if a patent applicant or owner takes a patent
eligibility case to that tribunal, it is “not likely to end well.” And while the
Federal Circuit in the past served as a “savior” in terms of reversing the
USPTO in appropriate circumstances, it has recently been less inclined to
rescue deserving claims.
One participant noted that examiners were more likely to uphold claims if
they analyzed validity under § § 102, 103, and 112 prior to analyzing eligibility
under § 101. Thus, the confusing nature of the “inventive concept” test might
be undermining careful analysis and understanding of patent applications.
4. Bioscience
Several participants who specialize in prosecuting life sciences applications
noted that it is now very difficult to obtain patents in particular inventive fields,
such as purified products, methods of treatment using purified molecules,
purified enzymes for industrial processes, enzyme variants, and personalized
medicine diagnostics—fields where advances had been patentable for decades,
or even centuries. Patent examiners seem less likely to allow claims focusing
on the structures of these molecules, and more likely to allow claims focusing
on the functions of these molecules. Examples of related types of claims not
being allowed include purified strains, purified enzymes for industrial
applications, and even enzyme variants. It is particularly problematic that the
market seeks purified substances to eliminate, for example, contamination, but
the patent law requires changes or even marked differences to be present. This
is an example of the law diverging from market and technology demands.
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Moreover, it is not clear under the law how substantial changes to natural
substances must be to warrant patentability.
As a result, companies are not pursuing such claims, are abandoning
applications, and are not filing continuations. Such companies believe that
patent protection for these inventions and discoveries are critically important,
and they are biding their time in the hope that the law of patent eligibility will
shift back to broader eligibility.
There has been a dramatic decrease in the ability to patent personalized
medicine claims. One participant noted a perverse situation reflecting the
apparent view that diagnostic inventions are not eligible as a category: a claim
otherwise eligible appears now to be ineligible if it includes a method of
diagnosing a disease or other problem or characteristic. As a result, more
specific, narrower, and more useful claims have been denied patent eligibility,
again merely because they include a step of diagnosis. It is also notable that the
standard for patent eligibility for diagnostics has moved in the opposite
direction of the underlying technology. Just as inventors have made significant
advancements improving the ability to provide targeted medical information
to patients, the Supreme Court has eliminated the eligibility of these inventions
for patents. The Supreme Court has created a test for eligibility that stands in
the way of the creation of new personalized medical inventions.
The effect on companies operating in the life sciences area has been
dramatic. In the past, these companies invested very large sums of money
(perhaps more than $2.5 billion) on research and development and,
simultaneously, filed patent applications to protect their investments. These
patent applications, when issued as patents, complied with the standards of
patent eligibility as those standards existed at the time the patents issued. Now,
sometimes 10 to 15 years later, the Supreme Court has changed those
standards and there is no recourse available. There is no opportunity to amend
the claims of the patents to comply with the new eligibility test.
5. Information Technology
Participants agreed that the Bilski and Alice decisions have substantially
eliminated patent eligibility for pure business methods claims—claims that do
not improve the functioning of computers. The viability of software claims is
hazier. Several practitioners noted that art units addressing encryption and
optical networks are not predictable.
One participant noted “almost no luck” in overcoming eligibility rejections
with pre-Alice patent applications. The only available strategy is to file a
Request for Continuing Examination and try to get a different examiner.
Notably, the data indicates that patent applications filed after Alice show no
significant improvement in terms of ability to overcome eligibility rejections.
Moreover, the data shows that sometimes the only rejection preventing a
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patent application from issuing as a patent is a rejection based on § 101. One
participant relayed how difficult it is to explain to a client that a patent
application has no prior art rejections under § § 102 or 103, and yet the patent
examiner has finally rejected the application as claiming something that is
conventional or routine.
Patent prosecutors noted that a key determinant of whether a software
claim will issue is how the patent is classified. If the patent is categorized within
the ecommerce area, there is little chance that its claims will be found eligible.
Thus, applicants focus a lot of their strategic effort in drafting their patents so
that they will be assigned to a technology center with a higher eligibility
proclivity. Prosecutors noted that most pre-Alice software-related filings are
lost and not worth pursuing.
A.

EFFECTS ON PATENT ASSERTION/LITIGATION/CASE MANAGEMENT

The fourth session focused on the effects of the shift in patent eligibility
jurisprudence on patent litigation activity and judicial case management.
1. Framing
An experienced patent litigator launched the session by summarizing the
key shifts in patent assertion strategy. This participant noted that patent
owners today are far less likely to assert dubious patents. The cases being filed
in the post-Alice era more frequently relate to patents on networking
technologies and other machine-related claims as opposed to business
methods. Nonetheless, there remains a substantial gray area due to the
vagueness of § 101 jurisprudence.
As a result of this uncertainty, plaintiffs are likely to assert more patents
and more claims. Prior to the Mayo decision, a typical filing would assert no
more than four to six patents because of limitation of trial time and jury’s
cognitive capacity. Following Mayo, plaintiffs are more likely to assert ten or
more patents as a hedge against the risks of patents being invalidated during
early case management on ineligibility grounds. This has raised the complexity
and potentially the cost of patent cases.
The other major effect of the shift in patent-eligibility standards has been
to front-load patent case management in the software and bioscience fields.
Defendants invariably seek early dismissal of claims under § 101. This puts the
judge in the difficult position of applying the vague “inventive application”
framework to patent claims that have already survived scrutiny under § § 102,
103, and 112 at the Patent Office. Nonetheless, many district courts have been
receptive to these motions, resulting in cursory assessment of patent
eligibility—often before claim construction. These district judges may be
deciding what is well-understood, routine, and conventional in technical fields
without a well-developed record, although for some patents they are able to
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find these admissions in the patent specification.
2. Discussion
While acknowledging that the Mayo/Alice standards lack coherence—often
boiling down to a subjective “I know it when I see it” standard—several
participants commented that the Alice decision has allowed defendants to get
particularly weak patent cases dismissed early in the litigation process, resulting
in substantial savings and effectively eliminating many dubious patents from
the system. These participants see the jurisprudence becoming somewhat
more predictable. In their view the decisions effectively exclude pure business
methods and emphasize technical solutions to technical problems.
Several bioscience industry participants noted that companies have been
reluctant to bring test cases, especially after the Supreme Court declined review
in the Sequenom case. They have lost faith in the Supreme Court and no longer
see the Federal Circuit as having the courage to percolate eligibility standards.
IV.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

The final workshop session focused on whether legislation is needed to
address the shift in patentable subject matter jurisprudence, as well as reactions
to various proposals. The session began with a brief summary of the pending
proposals and the various evaluative criteria set forth in Section I.C. We then
went around the table to afford all participants an opportunity to express their
perspectives and react to views of others.
A.

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

Building upon the prior presentations and discussions, the participants
engaged in a wide-ranging discussion of the current status of the law governing
patent eligibility, as well as the potential avenues for reform, including recent
legislative proposals. Several themes developed. On the one hand, a consensus
emerged that the current state of the law is indefensible as a matter of legal
principle and is causing particular difficulties for bioscience fields. Participants
largely agreed that the Supreme Court did not appear poised to make further
significant pronouncements about the scope of patentable subject matter in
the foreseeable future. As a result, participants largely agreed that legislation
would be necessary to address the problems that have emerged for bioscience
researchers. On the other hand, there was disagreement on the need for
legislative reform of patentable subject matter relating to computer software.
Moreover, there was a lack of agreement on the best solution to current
problems, and none of the current proposals listed in Section I.B. garnered
consensus. This Section summarizes the areas of consensus and disagreement,
with particular attention to the bioscience and software fields. We then
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summarize the participants’ views regarding the existing legislative proposals
and other potential approaches.
1. The Need for a Legislative Solution
The discussion repeatedly returned to the need for legislation to address
the problems plaguing patent eligibility. A consensus emerged that key aspects
of the Supreme Court’s Mayo, Alice, and Myriad decisions were indefensible as
a matter of statutory interpretation or fidelity to prior case law. Significantly,
this consensus spanned the range of industry representatives and legal
scholars. No one, for example, disputed Professors Lefstin and Menell’s
critique of the Supreme Court’s Mayo/Alice two-part test focusing on the
search for an “inventive” rather than merely a “practical” application of a
natural law or physical phenomenon.
More generally, there was consensus that a test requiring a search for an
“inventive” application of a natural law or physical phenomenon does not
provide adequate objective guidance to patent examiners, jurists, practitioners,
or the inventive community. As one participant explained, the current state of
affairs is “awful” because investors look for patents, which are critical to their
investment decisions. And yet under the current law, patent lawyers cannot
provide clear or reliable guidance about eligibility.
The manifestation of these concerns differs markedly across fields. Patent
prosecutors and examiners do not know what to do when confronted with a
question of software eligibility. In the words of one participant, prosecutors in
particular are “pulling their hair out.” By contrast, bioscience research
representatives and many legal scholars worry that the Supreme Court’s
standards relating to breakthrough scientific advances are far too clear and
clearly wrong. They believe that the Supreme Court has eliminated patent
protection for important useful research discoveries that are conventionally
applied. They emphasized that the major research challenge is often in
scientific discovery, not application. Once scientists discover scientific laws,
they can use routine, conventional, and well-understood techniques to make
such discoveries useful for improving public health, safety, and welfare.
Many participants viewed patent eligibility doctrine as incoherent. It lacks
the clarity needed for a property-based incentive regime to function effectively.
The lack of clarity has led the USPTO to restrict patent eligibility even beyond
what some participants believe the case law requires.
Although software companies that are defendants welcome the
opportunity to challenge vague and uninventive claims on eligibility grounds,
several participants noted that the lack of coherence presents problems. As
one participant noted, the “sky was falling” after the Federal Circuit’s State
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Street Bank decision,107 when the Federal Circuit opened the patent-eligibility
door to all software and business methods claims. While the Supreme Court
has brought an end to that problem, “the sky is falling again now” because the
Supreme Court has gone too far in the opposite direction in Mayo and Alice.
Many, but not all, participants agreed that legislation would be appropriate
to solve problems caused by the current state of the law. The challenge is in
finding a balanced compromise—which might be characterized as a separating
equilibrium in which bioscience researchers can once again pursue patent
protection for applications of new scientific discoveries, without unleashing a
wave of assertions of dubious software and business method patents. Some
others, particularly those from software companies that are frequently sued by
non-practicing entities, however, expressed a preference for letting the current
regime play out in the lower courts, even while recognizing the problems with
the current state of the law.
Many participants highlighted the need for a clear legislative solution over
the existing common law scheme. One participant expressed concern that the
United States is not leading the world with respect to patent eligibility; that
“things have gotten pretty bad” with respect to reaching the right result in
cases, particularly in the field of biotechnology; and, in response to the
argument that “we should just let the courts figure this out because it is too
hard,” one participant retorted that “we did, and [the courts] screwed it up
really badly.” Many participants bemoaned the prospects of Supreme Court
correction.
As several participants noted, the Supreme Court has now heard several
cases in this area since 2010 and has been unable to identify a coherent test
that comports with the legislative framework. Moreover, while the Supreme
Court’s Flook decision diverged from the traditional approach for patent
eligibility, the Court effectively overruled Flook in its decisions in Chakrabarty
and Diehr within a few years. The current Supreme Court, by contrast, does
not appear to be interested in revisiting the Mayo test (which resurrected
aspects of Flook), as evidenced by the denial of certiorari in Sequenom, where
the Court did not even ask for the Solicitor General’s view of the case despite
over twenty amicus briefs from a wide range of industries and scholars
advocating review. In the end, many participants, particularly those in
bioscience fields but also some in software fields, expressed an urgent need for
a legislative solution. Some participants thought case law development on
whether a software claim recited a technical effect could lead to a more
predictable and useful body of law.

107. See State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
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2. Field-Specific Concerns
Many participants directed their comments to challenges facing the
bioscience and software fields. In this Section, we summarize their comments
and identify particular areas of consensus and disagreement within these fields.
We also identify support for particular proposals from participants with
expertise in these fields.
a) Bioscience
Participants from the bioscience industries as well as several academics
strongly advocated for legislative reform of patent eligibility. As they explained,
the case law is not developing in the biotechnology area because of fear that
the courts will expand the ineligibility zone. Stakeholders are fearful of bringing
test cases. One participant expressed the concern that the Supreme Court can
take the next case (as it did in Mayo) and eliminate all of the intervening case
law development. According to another participant, every § 101 case “makes
your heart stop” because of the ability of courts to invalidate bioscience
patents after so much money is invested in research and development
predicated on the patentability of the underlying technology. Furthermore,
according to several participants, the USPTO has shown little appetite for
exercising its patent law expertise to confront new challenges. The agency has
been largely reactive, or has adopted rigid interpretations of cases such as
Myriad, interpretations that arguably restrict eligibility even beyond what the
Supreme Court requires.
Several participants expressed that the case for legislative reform is
particularly salient in particular areas of bioscience research such as medical
diagnostics. There was broad agreement among bioscience industry
representatives that the Supreme Court’s eligibility framework fundamentally
misapprehends the research challenges in the medical diagnostic field and that
a legislative solution is the only effective way to restore confidence in patent
protection for applied scientific advances in this area. The USPTO’s
interpretation of Myriad was another area of significant concern, because of
the loss of investment and development necessary to bring treatments based
on natural products to the public. One participant suggested that legislators
should focus on how best to provide incentives for optimal investment in
research and development. According to this participant, Congress needs to
confront the challenges of curing cancer. This participant advocated erring on
the side of patent eligibility so as to “provide a strong incentive for invention.”
In terms of specific proposals, some participants agreed that newly
discovered laws of nature should not be considered to be prior art, and that
practical applications of discoveries should be eligible for patenting. Other
participants noted concerns about the effects of overbroad protection on
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cumulative innovation—efforts by follow-on inventors and concerns about
licensing impediments and costs. Several participants expressed willingness to
expand 35 U.S.C. § 287 to protect doctors and/or to expand the experimental
use exception to protect individuals and companies who improve patented
technology from being subject to patent infringement liability. Others favored
expanding patent law’s experimental use exception to infringement liability so
as to balance the interest in providing an incentive for the original discovery
and the interest in encouraging follow-on inventors who desire to improve
upon practical applications of the discovery.
Several participants indicated a willingness, through legislative reform if
necessary, to treat the biotechnology industry differently than the software
industry. For example, if patenting of broad generic solutions is unacceptable
to the software industry or if it is not possible to identify an elegant, omnibus
solution, these participants were open to legislative reforms targeting
bioscience fields. One participant suggested looking outside of patent law for
a solution that would fund the biotechnology and life sciences industries, such
as medical reimbursements for diagnostics.
b) Software
Participants broadly agreed that the current eligibility regime fails to
provide predictability, although some in the software field expressed the view
that case law is improving predictability. Many commented that patent
eligibility jurisprudence is too blunt a tool to invalidate many software-related
claims, while noting many of these claims would likely fail § § 102, 103, and/or
112. Some participants noted that the current regime calls into question some
software-related claims that should be eligible, although unlike in the
bioscience area where participants generally favored patent eligibility for
conventional applications of scientific discoveries, it was more difficult to
articulate particular software areas that are being erroneously, categorically
excluded. In short, the current software eligibility regime causes inefficient
redundancy, a cloud of suspicion on all software-related patents, and incorrect
outcomes with respect to some software-related claims.
Some software industry representatives favored the current regime on the
purely instrumental ground that it provides a shortcut to invalidating many
dubious software patents and can save litigation resources. Others favored a
more open-ended framework that affords protection for applications of
discoveries, including algorithms. One participant expressed concern that this
latter approach is similar to the “useful, concrete and tangible result” test most
commonly associated with the Federal Circuit’s decision in State Street Bank.108

108. Id. at 1373–75.
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Several participants, moreover, expressed the view that pure business methods
should not be patent eligible, even if they are implemented on computers,
because of low development cost, deleterious effects on free market
competition, and the absence of any need to provide an incentive to ensure
their development. One participant defended the eligibility of pure business
methods on the ground that all processes meeting the §§ 102, 103, and 112
requirements should be patentable.
Several participants expressed support for a technological arts test as a way
of excluding eligibility for business methods (even if they use computers in
non-technologically inventive ways), while preserving eligibility for software
claims that improve the functioning of computers and computing technology.
One participant noted, however, that it is unclear how the technological arts
test applies to new technologies. That participant noted that European patent
examiners initially considered artificial intelligence to be ineligible. Another
participant suggested that the difficulty of determining eligibility of software
relates to the broad statutory term “process,” and so a legislative solution
might focus on narrowing that particular statutory category.
Other participants emphasized that software patents are plagued by
overbroad scope resulting in significant part from functional claiming. They
advocated addressing these concerns through applying § 112(b) and (f) in a
rigorous way, including early in litigation. Others similarly suggested that the
primary concern is lack of enablement or written description under § 112(a),
and similarly encouraged applying these doctrines earlier in litigation.
Some, but not all, participants involved with software nevertheless
indicated a desire for a wait-and-see approach to allow the case law to develop
with respect to software-related claims. Others similarly expressed concern
about the political feasibility of amending patent eligibility at a time when many
software companies are concerned about abusive patent assertion. Several
participants suggested that any legislative reform to patent eligibility that
eliminates this early dispute resolution mechanism would need to be paired
with other reforms that help reach similarly efficient results. We address this
interest in more detail below. We note, however, that several other participants
responded that we should not impair innovation in the pursuant of judicial
efficiency.
3. Evaluation of Existing Legislative Proposals and New Proposals
In the previous Section, we summarized comments on the impact of
particular proposals on the bioscience and software industries. In this Section,
we summarize more general comments as well as comments directed to
particular proposals but not limited in scope to either bioscience or software
industry concerns. We also summarize new proposals identified in the
workshop.
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Most participants agreed that eligibility should be a “coarse filter” or
“minimal hurdle.” Furthermore, several participants expressed the desire to
prevent deconstruction of patent claims, which involves ignoring claim
elements.
Many participants expressed support or concern with particular proposals.
One participant, for example, favored the IPO proposal as a constructive
starting point, but also thought that a test focusing on whether the claimed
invention is in the technological arts might find broader support. Another
participant favored a test that focused on whether claims are specific and
patentable under §§ 102, 103, and 112. Another participant suggested adopting
a technological arts test, but at the same time making it clear that technology
includes practical applications of discoveries. Such a technological arts test
might be neutral facially, but have differential impact in different industries (in
particular biotechnology versus software). Yet another participant suggested
that a technological arts test, without some definition, is ambiguous and might
be seen as consistent with what courts are doing now. This participant
suggested that technological arts be defined as human-directed efforts to
harness natural laws and physical phenomena to achieve practical end results.
This definition, it was posed, would exclude purely mental processes.
What this discussion highlighted is that none of the proposals, at least in
their current form, provides an effective test for distinguishing between the
bioscience and software fields. Some participants advocated developing a test
that expressly distinguishes between bioscience and software eligibility. Several
participants saw merit in a test that restored the practical application of a
discovery standard in conjunction with expressly limiting patent eligibility to
the technological arts. Some questioned whether “technological” could be
clearly delineated. Other participants, however, expressed a desire for a transtechnology approach. They noted the convergence of bioscience and software
fields through, for example, advances in bioinformatics.
Some participants expressed reluctance to depart from the current
standards because of the litigation cost savings and speed advantage of being
able to challenge patent validity early in litigation through a motion pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Several participants, however,
recommended that courts allow early 12(b)(6) motions on more appropriate
patent law doctrines that have extensive historical pedigrees that have
produced objective guidelines, including the written description and
enablement requirements. In this regard, several participants expressed a desire
to preserve the ability early in litigation to eliminate poor quality patent
assertions made by patent assertion entities (which occurs primarily in the
software industry), while recognizing that the current test unfortunately
undermines research and development incentives and investment in
bioscience.
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Rather than have Congress fashion legislation adopting a new test for
patent eligibility, some participants suggested Congress give the USPTO the
authority to do so. One participant, for example, noted the inherent difficulty
in predicting technological advances and the patent system’s purpose in
bringing the unknown into the known. For this participant, these
considerations suggested it might be better to defer to the USPTO rather than
courts given the USPTO’s expertise and ability to coordinate and update
standards. Another participant noted the tension between maintaining
flexibility to allow for accurate results (particularly in different industries) and
constraining judicial intervention. This participant questioned whether courts
should be making these distinctions at all, or instead whether the USPTO
should make eligibility determinations without having courts revisit the
question. This participant suggested that Congress should give the USPTO
rulemaking authority to decide what is and what is not eligible.
B.

TOWARDS A COMPROMISE PROPOSAL: THE NEED FOR CONSENSUSBUILDING

The workshop revealed broad agreement that the Supreme Court’s patent
eligibility jurisprudence has diverged from the Patent Act’s text and legislative
history as well as long-standing jurisprudential standards. The participants also
agreed that the Supreme Court’s stated rationale and formulation lacks a sound
foundation and misapprehends the Neilson v. Harford decision on which it
grounds the inventive application standard. Furthermore, the workshop
revealed a consensus that it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will reconsider
the patent eligibility issue in the foreseeable future. Conferees also doubted
that the Federal Circuit will confront the core concerns surrounding patent
eligibility. Thus, legislative reform will be necessary to effect significant change
in patent-eligibility standards.
While nearly all of the conferees recognized that this state of the law poses
serious concerns for bioscience research and development, there existed
substantial reluctance on the part of some software industry representatives
about pursuing legislative reform that could increase patent assertion activity
and raise defense risks and costs in the software field. Some participants also
thought that the courts should be given time to develop an appropriate screen
for the eligibility of software patents and saw some progress in the developing
case law.
This suggests to the workshop convenors and authors of this report
(Jeffrey Lefstin, Peter Menell, and David Taylor) that the most fruitful
approach to reform legislation would restore the traditional patent-eligibility
standard at least for bioscience advances—that is, establishing that
conventional application of scientific discoveries are eligible for patent
protection—while addressing concerns about cumulative creativity and
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abusive patent assertion. Such additional provisions could include the
following: (1) an expanded experimental use exception at least for doctors and
medical researchers; (2) exclusion of non-technological subject matter, notably
pure business methods (a technological arts test); (3) a mechanism to
encourage courts to consider 12(b)(6) motions directed to § 112 issues (as
opposed to § 101 issues) early in patent case management; (4) fee-shifting
aimed at discouraging nuisance value patent lawsuits; (5) higher thresholds for
enhanced damages in the software field; and/or (6) shorter duration for
algorithm-based inventions—i.e., where the point of non-obviousness is a
computer-implemented algorithm. We also note that compromise legislation
might also address distinctive issues relating to affected industries that lie
outside of the patent field, such as reimbursement policies relating to medical
diagnostics.
We recognize, however, that there are differing views regarding each of
these compromise elements. We therefore call for consensus-building among
the interested constituencies. In this regard, we recognize that the IPO,
AIPLA, and ABA-IPL proposals were approved by the governing boards of
those organizations, which include representatives of various constituencies,
including parties having significant interests in the bioscience and software
industries. There was no consensus among our participants, however, that any
of these proposals should be the exclusive focus of a legislative effort going
forward. In short, there was a consensus that more discussion is necessary. In
this regard, in particular, we recommend a future workshop aimed at
developing a compromise package.

2018]

ADDRESSING PATENT ELIGIBILITY CHALLENGES

601

APPENDIX A: PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER WORKSHOP
AGENDA
9:00 am

Breakfast

9:30 am

Introduction

10:00 am

Legal Background

11:15 am

Break

11:30 am

Effects on R&D

12:15 pm

Lunch Buffet

12:45 pm

Working Lunch: Effects on Prosecution

1:45 pm

Effects on Patent Assertion/Litigation/Case Management

2:30 pm

Break

2:45 pm

Legislative Proposals

3:30 pm

Discussion of Proposals

5:00 pm

Next Steps

5:30 pm

Reception

6:15 pm

Dinner
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